The Future of Executive Compensation
Bjorn N. Jorgensen, Paige H. Patrick, Naomi S. Soderstrom; Heaping of Executive Compensation. Journal of Management Accounting Research 1 March ; 32 1 : — We document that an unexpectedly large number of CEOs receive round compensation i.
We investigate whether, consistent with heaping, the frequency of round compensation varies with proxies for boards of directors' effort in setting compensation. We find that round compensation is more common when boards have characteristics suggesting they provide weak oversight of compensation and thus face more uncertainty in estimating compensation. We also find less frequent round compensation when boards face stronger pressure from external stakeholders, encouraging boards to expend additional cognitive effort in setting compensation.
Executive Compensation and Incentives
Further, consistent with weak oversight of compensation, round compensation tends to be higher than non-round compensation. However, we do not find a consistent association between this higher, round Compensstion and future firm performance. Sign In or Create an Account.
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Article Navigation. Research Article April 21 Heaping of Executive Compensation Bjorn N. Jorgensen ; Bjorn N. This Site. Google Scholar. Paige H. Patrick ; Paige H.]
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