Bayesian Persuasion And Information Disclosures - amazonia.fiocruz.br

Bayesian Persuasion And Information Disclosures Video

03 - Babichenko - Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion Bayesian Persuasion And Information Disclosures

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Martin Szydlowski. I study an entrepreneur who finances a project with uncertain cash flows and who jointly chooses the disclosure and financing policies. This class of threshold policies is optimal for any prior belief, monotone security, and increasing utility function of the entrepreneur. I characterize how the disclosure threshold depends on the underlying security, the prior, and the cost of investment. The financing choice of the entrepreneur is determined by a new trade-off between the likelihood of persuading investors and relinquishing cash flow rights.

Piotr DworczakAnton Kolotilin.

We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure Persuasiin the objective function at the prior belief. Under regularity conditions, our general duality result implies known results for the case when the objective function depends only on the expected state.

We apply our approach to characterize the optimal signal in the case when the state is two-dimensional. The Persuasion Duality. All rights reserved. Copyright: Copyright Elsevier B. N2 - We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion.

AB - We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. Overview Fingerprint. Abstract We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion.

Keywords Bayesian persuasion Duality Information design. Access to Document Link to publication in Scopus. Link to the citations in Scopus.

This is an uncorrected proof.

Unknown Journal. Dworczak, Piotr ; Kolotilin, Anton. In: Unknown Journal. In: Unknown Journal Dworczak PKolotilin A.]