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In his recent IAI news articlePhilip defends panpsychism against the criticisms outlined in that discussion, and presents his own arguments against analytic idealism. Here, Bernardo responds. What does Philip mean, then, when he claims that the physical world is fundamental?

Philip cites an earlier essay to make sense of this seeming contradiction. But in that essay we find his claim repeated:. This approach, known as panpsychism, allows us to hold that both physical matter and consciousness are fundamental. This is because, according to panpsychism, particles and fields simply are forms of consciousness. In what sense are particles and fields physically fundamental if they are forms of consciousness? The only point where Philip seems to depart from idealism is his insistence that the inner structure of subjectivity is the inner structure of physical entities. In other words, according to Philip, the building blocks of physical entities are also the building blocks of subjectivity: our ordinary human Argument Essay Against Large Capacity Magazines is somehow constituted by a combination of the putative subjectivities of the myriad elementary particles making up our nervous system.

What do we know about ourselves from the inside? It is that we are conscious as a whole. If what Philip wants is to honor what we know about ourselves from the inside, he may have to abandon constitutive panpsychism. Be that as it may, Philip is legitimately interested in combining introspective first-person insight and objective scientific observations. For him, failure to achieve this combination is grounds for rejecting mainstream physicalism and dualism.

He assumes then that panpsychism is all that is left. But if we are to conclude anything from a process of elimination, we must not forget a few other alternatives. Before looking for ways to accommodate incoherencies in panpsychismwe should at least consider analytic idealism, the very metaphysics Philip is criticizing.

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here But does it, really? After all, the structure of the contents of perception is not necessarily the structure of the perceiv er. Argument Essay Against Large Capacity Magazines pixelation is a property of the screennot of the person represented on the screen; it is an artifact of representationnot the structure of being. Once this is clarified, analytic idealism is entirely consistent with the observations of neuroscience: brain function is part of what our conscious inner life looks like when observed from across a dissociative boundary. Therefore, there must be tight correlations between patterns of brain activity and conscious inner life, for the former is simply the extrinsic appearance of the latter; a pixelated appearance.

As discussed at length in an earlier essay of minepanpsychism assumes that elementary subatomic particles are discrete, spatially-bound entities. The building blocks of nature are spatially unbound quantum fields, perhaps even a single field. As such, if Philip wants to attribute consciousness to the building blocks of nature, he will necessarily contradict the notion that consciousness is fundamentally bound or localized in space, and therefore fail to account for the seemingly private character of personal subjectivity.

Philip responds to this contention by distinguishing two forms of panpsychism: micropsychism i.

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In other words, panpsychism survives my criticism because it also admits of a single, spatially unbound cosmic subject. But in what sense, then, would it oppose analytic idealism? If Philip abandons this notion by adopting a cosmic subject, he will abandon his key contention against analytic idealism. The only alternative is for Argumnt to argue that I am wrong in stating that, according to modern physics, there are only fields, not literal particles:.

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But in any case, the point is moot as a panpsychist does not have to commit to particles. The point is certainly not mute insofar as Philip is ostensibly attempting to criticize analytic idealism. The question then boils down to whether that one paper is strong enough to overcome and change a consensus that has been built up in physics over several decades.

More generally, it allows us to e reconcile quantum mechanics with special relativity, both of which we know are true and thus must be reconcilable. The explanatory power of thinking of particles as field excitations Argument Essay Against Large Capacity Magazines formidable, even overwhelming.

Philip contends that my criticisms of panpsychism are applicable only to a reductionist formulation, and calls for an argument against non-reductionist panpsychism. I am happy to oblige: a known weakness of panpsychism is the fact that, instead of offering a new explanationit merely postulates more properties as brute facts of nature. Namely, it postulates consciousness as a fundamental property of mattersimply adding to the existing reduction base of physicalism, without explaining either consciousness or something else in terms of consciousness. Philip then turns to a more explicit criticism of analytic idealism, most of which regrettably ignores the substance of an earlier response.]