The Main Collective Theory Of Functionalist Theories Video
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It is widely accepted that consciousness or, more generally, mental activity is in some way correlated to the behavior of the material brain. Since quantum theory is the most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available, it is a legitimate question to ask whether quantum theory can help us to understand consciousness. Several approaches answering this question affirmatively, proposed in recent decades, will be surveyed. There are three basic types of corresponding approaches: 1 consciousness is a manifestation of quantum processes in the brain, 2 quantum concepts are used to understand consciousness without referring to brain activity, and 3 matter and consciousness are regarded as dual aspects of one underlying reality. Major contemporary variants of these quantum-inspired approaches will be discussed. It will be pointed out that they make different epistemological assumptions and use quantum theory in different ways.
The Main Collective Theory Of Functionalist Theories
2. Philosophical Background Assumptions
The theory of collective agency and intentionality is a flourishing field of research, and our understanding of these phenomena has arguably increased greatly in recent years. Extant theories, however, are still ill-equipped to explain certain aspects of collective intentionality. The collective-level analogue of interpretationism Tueory out to look different in some ways from the individual-level theory, but is well-suited to accommodating phenomena such as hybrid collective intentionality.
It is not uncommon in everyday thought and talk to ascribe intentionality, and more specifically propositional attitudes, to collectives. While some have downplayed the significance of such attributions, regarding it as loose talk e. Quinton it has become gradually more common among philosophers to take such ascriptions seriously, treating collective agents as genuine entities which genuinely have propositional attitudes. That is not to say that they are inclined to put the intentionality that collectives exhibit on a par with that exhibited by individuals.
The default approach is to treat the intentional states of collectives as The Main Collective Theory Of Functionalist Theories in some manner from the intentional states that their Funchionalist enjoy: collective intentionality is a secondary kind of intentionality built upon the primary intentionality of individuals.
Introduction
However, we will argue that this thought is often developed into an approach to collective intentionality The Main Collective Theory Of Functionalist Theories is too narrow to accommodate the full variety of collective intentionality phenomena. We must take a somewhat broader and somewhat more subtle view of how collectives come to exhibit intentionality. In this paper we set out such a view. We will start by explaining the type of model of collective intentionality that we are hoping to improve upon Sect.
We then go through some cases that illustrate how the attitudes of collectives do not depend in a straightforward way on the attitudes of members of those collectives Sect. In particular, we draw attention to the phenomenon of hybrid collective intentionality, that is, collective intentionality that comes about as the result Assesment 2 interaction between human agents and artificial entities which may or may not be agents Sect.
It has so far drawn little attention in the collective intentionality literature, despite its considerable real-world significance. In Sect.
After a clarification of the terms used to present the approach Sect. This type of theory of content has been developed at a fairly sophisticated level for the case of individual intentionality Sect.
1. Introduction
An adequate model of collective intentionality needs to pay particular attention to the structure of collectives or so we argueso we spell out the notion of structure that is involved and articulate it using the theory of variable embodiment Sect. We can ascribe intentional states to collectives in a number of ways. When we ascribe aggregate attitudes to a collective, we use some kind of aggregation rule e. The aggregate attitudes of a collective are thus relative to what rule we choose, and what rule is appropriate in a given case depends on our theoretical or practical interests. The notion of a common attitude is a generalisation of the Theoties notion of common knowledge.]
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